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Abstract  
 
For decades, American workers have been subjected to increasing pressure to 
become forced capitalists, in the sense that to provide for retirement for themselves, 
and to pay for college for their children, they must turn part of their income every 
month over to mutual funds who participate in 401(k) and 529 programs.  These 
“Worker Investors” save for the long term, often hold portfolios that are a proxy for 
the entire economy, and depend on the economy’s ability to generate good jobs and 
sustainable growth in order for them to be able to have economic security.  In recent 
years, there has been a heartening improvement in the self-awareness of the major 
mutual fund families — BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, and Fidelity (the “Big 
4”) — that have Worker Investors’ capital.  This Big 4 has grown enormously 
because of the legal pressures that generate capital inflows to them every month from 
Worker Investors.  To their credit, the Big 4 recognize that they have a duty to think 
and act in a way aligned with the interests of Worker Investors by encouraging the 
public companies in which they invest to implement business plans that will generate 
sound long-term growth.  In fact, the Big 4 have recently recognized that unless 
public companies act in a manner that is environmentally, ethically, and legally 
responsible, they are unlikely to be successful in the long run.  Thus, the Big 4 are 
more willing than ever to second-guess company management to fulfill their 
fiduciary duties. 
 
 In one area, however, the Big 4 continue to have a fiduciary blind spot:  they 
let corporate management spend the Worker Investors’ entrusted capital for political 
purposes without constraint.  The Big 4 abdicate in the area of political spending 
because they know that they do not have Worker Investors’ capital for political 
reasons and because the funds do not have legitimacy to speak for them politically.  
But mutual funds do not invest in public companies for political reasons, and public 
company management has no legitimacy to use corporate funds for political 
expression either.  Thus, a “double legitimacy” problem infects corporate political 
spending.   
 
 This Essay identifies and illustrates this double legitimacy problem, and 
shows why unconstrained corporate political spending is contrary to the interests of 
Worker Investors.  Precisely because Worker Investors hold investments for the long 
term and have diversified portfolios that track the whole economy, political spending 
by corporate managers to tilt the regulatory playing field is harmful to them, as 
humans who suffer as workers, consumers, and citizens when companies tilt the 
regulatory process in a way that allows for more pollution, more dangerous 
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workplaces, less leverage for workers to get decent pay and benefits, and more 
unsafe products and deceptive services.  But even as diversified investors, 
unconstrained corporate political spending is likely to create harm, as both common 
sense and empirical evidence suggest.  Not only that, there is no danger that public 
companies would have too little voice in the political process if their spending were 
subject to constraint by stockholders.  Corporations have many other tools, including 
their own PACs funded by voluntary contributions, their lobbying expenditures, and 
the influence they wield as employers and taxpayers — tools that made business 
interests predominate in political spending even before Citizens United let them free 
to spend treasury funds without inhibition.  For these reasons, the case against 
unconstrained corporate political spending is very strong. 
 
 As of now, however, the Big 4 refuse to support even proposals to require the 
very disclosure they would need if they were to monitor corporate political spending.  
And their capacity to monitor if they have the information is lacking.  But, if the Big 
4 open their fiduciary eyes and follow the recommendation of industry icon Jack 
Bogle, and vote to require that any political spending from corporate treasury funds 
be subject to approval of a supermajority of stockholders, they alone could cure the 
double legitimacy problem of corporate political spending.  Because of their 
substantial voting power, the support of the Big 4 would ensure that this check on 
illegitimate corporate political spending would be put in place and thus make an 
important contribution to restoring some basic fairness to our political process. 
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I.  Introduction  
 One heartening development in corporate governance has been Americans’ 
increasing willingness to embrace a rational approach to investing, forsaking a futile 
search for alpha, and instead holding a basket of securities that is a proxy for the 
entire market, and seeking a sustainable increase in their wealth tied to the 
economy’s overall growth.1  These “Worker Investors” save primarily for two long-
term purposes:  to pay for college for their children and retirement for themselves.  
As heartening has been another recent development.  Institutional investors are 
becoming more aware of their fiduciary duty to match their responsibilities as voters 
and monitors of portfolio companies with the long-term goals of the Worker 
                                                 
1 To quickly put a few numbers on the trend.  In 2017 alone, investment in “passive” funds 
increased $220 billion, but investors withdrew $207 billion from actively managed equity mutual 
funds.  Morningstar Direct Asset Flows Commentary: United States, MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 18, 
2018), https://www.morningstar.com/content/dam/marketing/shared/Company/LandingPages/Re
search/Documents/Morningstar_Fund_Flows_Commentary_Dec_2017.pdf.  The same is true for 
2016, with investors withdrawing $340 billion from active funds and investing an additional $553 
into passive funds.  Morningstar Direct Asset Flows Commentary: United States, 
MORNINGSTAR (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://corporate.morningstar.com/us/documents/assetflows/assetflowsjan2017.pdf. 
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Investors whose capital they control.  Precisely because Worker Investors do not 
jump in and out of stocks, hold a portfolio that is a rough proxy for the overall 
economy, and cannot profit from bubbles that burst, but only from durable increases 
in corporate profits, they need companies to make money the old fashioned way, by 
selling useful products and services, and not by gimmicks or by slighting things like 
environmental compliance and worker safety to get a short-term edge. 
 For too many years, institutional investors had not taken into account the 
unique perspective of stuck-in, long-term investors, and instead voted their shares in 
a manner more consistent with the momentary impulses of alpha chasers, folks more 
focused on the next trading days than the next year, and certainly not the next decade.  
The awareness of institutional investors that they need to better align their behavior 
as fiduciaries with the economic interests of Worker Investors is not just welcome, 
but long overdue.   
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And the center of plate investment funds also deserve credit for increasing 
their focus on sustainable, responsible corporate growth.  These institutional 
investors have recognized that Worker Investors do not benefit when corporations 
engage in regulatory short-cuts to gain advantage, rather than outcompeting other 
businesses by delivering a better product or service.  Short-cuts get found out.  And 
companies that externalize costs to society and other companies do not benefit 
Worker Investors who pay for those externalities as investors holding the entire 
market, and as human beings who breathe air, consume products, and pay taxes. 
 But institutional investors need to do more to fulfill their fiduciary duty to 
align their voting policies with the interests of the Worker Investors whose capital 
they control.  Tonight, I will talk about one area where a fundamental shift in 
institutional investor behavior must happen.  On an issue closely connected to the 
widespread feeling that our economy is not working for all, institutional investors 
have a huge blind spot.    
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 In every other area, institutional investors have applied increasing scrutiny to 
the behavior of corporate managers.  But in one area, they let corporate managers 
run free.  That area is incredibly important to whether our society works for 
everyone:  political spending.   
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II.  The Oddment of Big 4 Political Spending Policies: The Persistence of Old-
School Deference to Management Despite Otherwise Independent and 
Skeptical Voting Policies 
A.  The Big 4’s Increasing Clout and Skepticism of Management  
To provide context for discussing this blind spot, some important realities 
must be understood, starting with the current voting policies of the largest 
investment managers.   
The history of mutual fund behavior in monitoring portfolio companies is 
complicated.  Suffice for present purposes to say that mainstream mutual funds were 
not anxious to spend money voting their shares, preferred the Wall Street rule of 
moving on,2 and are late arrivals at the corporate governance hoo ha party, i.e., the 
party thrown by interests who believe that there should be a much higher amount of 
stockholder activism, election contests, business shakeups, and even litigation.3  The 
                                                 
2 See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism 
on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 553 (2016) (The “Wall Street Rule” consists of 
dissatisfied institutional investors selling their stock and moving on).   
3 See James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund 
Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (“Although mutual funds historically 
followed the ‘Wall Street rule,’ selling their shares in underperforming portfolio companies rather 
than engaging in shareholder activism, the landscape may be changing.”). 
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founder of Vanguard, Jack Bogle, has described the mindset of traditional money 
managers well:  “for decades, with a handful of exceptions, the participation of our 
institutional money managers in corporate governance has been limited, reluctant 
and unenthusiastic.”4   
But, in recent decades, goaded by certain federal policies and other pressures,5 
mainstream mutual funds have become more active.6  Mutual funds, and in particular 
                                                 
4 John C. Bogle, The Supreme Court Had Its Say.  Now Let Shareholders Decide, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 14, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/opinion/15bogle.html.       
5 See, e.g., Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 
47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922 (Jan. 31, 2003) (requiring mutual fund 
companies to provide disclosures on proxy voting policies relating to portfolio securities they 
hold); DOL Op. Ltr. to Helmuth Fandl, Avon Products, Inc., 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 391 n.4 (Feb. 
29, 1988) (“Avon Letter”) (finding that voting rights are a plan asset that the fiduciary must 
exercise “solely in the interests of . . . and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to 
participants and beneficiaries”).  “The so-called Avon Letter, issued by the DOL in 1988, has been 
widely heralded in corporate governance circles as signifying that the prudent exercise of proxy 
voting is not optional.”  Richard H. Koppes & Maureen L. Reilly, An Ounce of Prevention:  
Meeting the Fiduciary Duty to Monitor an Index Fund through Relationship Investing, 20 J. CORP. 
L. 413, 430 (1995).   
6 See Christopher Whittall, Activists Investors Are Spending More and Shifting Their Strategies 
(Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-are-spending-more-
and-shifting-their-strategies-1544101200 (“Some activist victories have come from getting 
passive shareholders to support their demands, adding additional pressure.  Passive funds, which 
account for 20% of global investment-fund assets versus 8% a decade earlier, can be helpful allies 
for activists looking to overcome board-level resistance.”); Coffee & Palia, supra note 2, at 572 
(finding that activists’ influence is growing in part because of their ability to partner with pension 
funds and mutual funds); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 
995 (2010) (noting “the change by mutual funds and public pension funds to a more 
confrontational mode of activism”); Lyman Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director “Independence”: 
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index funds, have displayed a willingness to support the initiatives of other activist 
investors in dismantling takeover defenses, voting against certain pay policies when 
company performance declines in a bad year, pressuring companies to sell, and even 
helping activist investors replace board members and corporate management.7   
                                                 
Mutual Fund Fee Litigation and Gartenberg at Twenty-Five, 61 VAND. L. REV. 497, 534 n.228 
(2008) (“Mutual fund culture may currently be changing in another respect, as well—the increased 
willingness of mutual funds to be more ‘activist’ investors, just as public pension funds and other 
institutional investors have been doing for some time on various corporate governance issues.”).  
7 Coffee, Jr. & Palia, The Wolf at the Door, supra note 2, at 556, 572 (observing that activists 
investors “are winning [proxy] fights, securing partial or complete victory in 19 of the 24 contests 
they initiated in 2013” in part because of activists investors’ increasing success in “partnering up 
with pension funds and mutual funds”); Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, 
Passive Investors *15 (Penn. Law & Econ Research Paper No. 18-12, Apr. 13, 2018), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3192069 (citing Simi Kedia, Laura Starks & 
Xianjue Wang, Institutional Investors and Hedge Fund Activism (Nov. 2016), 
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-
bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=AFA2018&paper_id=342) (finding “that shareholder 
activism is more pervasive at firms with higher ownership by institutional investors”); see also 
David Benoit & Kirsten Grind, Activist Investors’ Secret Ally:  Big Mutual Funds (Wall St. J. Aug 
9, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-secret-ally-big-mutual-funds-
1439173910 (discussing how “mutual funds are siding with activists” and that large mutual funds 
“have backed some of the most prominent activist campaigns”).  One recent and prominent 
example of large mutual funds backing activist investors is BlackRock and State Street’s support 
of Nelson Peltz’s proxy contest for seats on Proctor & Gamble’s board.  See Lauren Hirsch, P&G 
Says Shareholders Reject Peltz’s Bid for Board Seat by Slim Margin, Activist Says Vote a Dead 
Heat, CNBC (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/10/procter-gamble-shareholders-
vote-against-adding-nelson-peltz-to-board.html (“Of P&G’s top three shareholders, State Street 
Global Advisors and BlackRock sided with Peltz, while Vanguard backed P&G, according to 
sources familiar with the matter.”). 
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But institutional investors are not just getting involved in boardroom battles.  
As mentioned, some prominent mutual funds have now expressed the view that their 
portfolio companies should act with sufficient regard for the law and general social 
responsibility.  That is, in the area of corporate social responsibility, the largest 
institutional investors seem to be evolving in a positive direction. 
Key funds like BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street justify their new 
concern about ESG (“Environmental, Social, and Governance”) in terms of their 
duty as fiduciaries to generate quality long-term returns for their investors.  In other 
words, these funds view ESG through the narrower lens of long-term profit 
enhancement, not from the broader viewpoint of human citizens with a full range of 
values.8 
                                                 
8 See e.g., Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities 12, BLACKROCK (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-
guidelines-us.pdf; Vanguard’s Proxy Voting Guidelines, https://about.vanguard.com/investment-
stewardship/policies-and-guidelines/; Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines State Street 8, 
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2018/03/Proxy-
Voting-and-Engagement-Guidelines-NA-20180301.pdf (“As a fiduciary, we consider the 
financial and economic implications of environmental and social issues first and foremost. 
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Larry Fink, Blackrock’s CEO, argues that “[t]o prosper over time, every 
company must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes 
a positive contribution to society.”9  And Blackrock “expect[s] the board of directors 
to promote and protect shareholder interest by . . . addressing business issues 
including social, ethical, and environmental issues when they have the potential to 
materially impact company reputation and performance.”10  Vanguard likewise 
“actively engages with portfolio companies and their boards to discuss material 
                                                 
Environmental and social factors not only can have an impact on the reputation of companies; they 
may also represent significant operational risks and costs to business.”).  
9 Larry Fink, A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-
relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter. 
10 Global Corporate Governance & Engagement Principles 5, BLACKROCK (June 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/890393/000119312515334865/d25691dex99corpgov.
htm (emphasis added).  Blackrock’s “number one focus, as a fiduciary investor, is on generating 
the long-term sustainable financial returns on which our clients depend to meet their financial 
goals.”  BlackRock Investment Stewardship:  2018 Annual Report 1, BLACKROCK (Aug. 30, 2018), 
available at https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-stewardship-
report-2018.pdf.  And BlackRock also frames its policy on environmental and social issues as one 
of fiduciary duty, saying “[o]ur fiduciary duty to clients is to protect and enhance their economic 
interest in the companies in which we invest on their behalf. It is within this context that we 
undertake our corporate governance activities. We believe that well-managed companies will deal 
effectively with the material environmental and social (“E&S”) factors relevant to their 
businesses.”  Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities BlackRock 12, 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-
guidelines-us.pdf. 
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risks, ranging from business and operational risks to environmental and social risk” 
but understands that it “is required to manage [its] funds in the best interests of 
shareholders and obligated to maximize returns . . . to help shareholders meet their 
financial goals.”11  And State Street emphasizes that “[w]ell-developed 
environmental and social management systems . . . generate efficiencies and 
enhance productivity, both of which impact shareholder value in the long-term.”12   
This focus on long-term returns characterizes not just the so-called Big 3 
indexers,13 Blackrock, Vanguard and State Street, but also the other huge player that 
                                                 
11 Policies and Guidelines, VANGUARD (2018), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-
stewardship/policies-and-guidelines/. 
12 Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines 8 State Street, https://www.ssga.com/investment-
topics/environmental-social-governance/2018/03/Proxy-Voting-and-Engagement-Guidelines-
NA-20180301.pdf.  State Street also emphasizes a similar theme on voting, seeking “to vote 
director elections in a way which we, as a fiduciary, believe will maximize the long-term value of 
each portfolio’s holdings . . . . [T]he role of the board, in [State Street]’s view, is to carry out its 
responsibilities in the best long-term interest of the company and its shareholders.”  Global Proxy 
Voting and Engagement Policies 4, STATE STREET (Mar. 2016), 
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2016/Global-Proxy-
Voting-and-Engagement-Principles-20160301.pdf (emphasis added). 
13 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance:  
Theory, Evidence, and Policy *1 (Working Paper, Nov. 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3282794 (“BlackRock, State Street Global 
Advisors (SSGA), and Vanguard [are] often referred to as the “Big Three.”).   
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has enormous amounts of Worker Investors’ capital:  Fidelity.  Although Fidelity is 
more known for its actively managed funds, it also professes to focus on the long 
term in its investment focus because of whose money it has.14  Thus, Fidelity 
“think[s] generationally and invest[s] for the long term.”15  And Fidelity is 
increasingly competing with the Big 3 in the index space.16  To clearly illustrate how 
                                                 
14 And even Fidelity’s actively managed funds likely have a large passive or indexed component 
to them, as would those of other fund families.  See John C. Coates, IV, The Future of Corporate 
Governance Part I:  The Problem of Twelve 13 (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247337 (“Active funds commonly 
minimize management costs by essentially holding an index and selecting a few companies to 
over- or under-weight.  This allows them to distinguish themselves from index funds, while not 
attempting to engage in serious analysis of the value of each portfolio company.  The ‘active share,’ 
as the portion of active funds that is significantly different from what would follow from a passive 
indexing strategy is commonly estimated to exceed 50% at many funds, resulting in an additional 
chunk of the market being fairly understood as indexed and truly passive.”).  For this reason, 
Worker Investors who have actively traded funds in their portfolios have largely the same interests 
as those who solely invest in index funds.  In fact, even if one solely buys actively traded funds, 
but does so for generations, it is difficult to avoid the need for a governance system that fosters 
widespread growth of the economy, as most funds have diverse holdings that cover many sectors 
of the economy. 
15 About Us, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelityinternational.com/global/about/default.page.    
16 Justin Baer, Fidelity Eliminates Fees on Two New Index Funds (Wall St. J. Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fidelity-index-fund-fees-tumble-to-zero-1533141096 (noting that 
Fidelity cut fees on its index funds to compete against Vanguard and other, more traditional, index 
fund providers); Eric Rosenbaum, Fidelity’s New No-Fee Index Funds Bring In $1 Billion in First 
Month (CNBC, Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/04/fidelity-offers-first-ever-free-
index-funds-and-1-billion-follows.html (noting that Fidelity’s reduction in fees on its index funds 
is seeking “to grab market share from . . . Vanguard”).   
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important it is that mainstream mutual funds address the problem that is the subject 
of this lecture, I am going to focus on this Big 4.17   
This focus on the Big 4 reflects the clout they wield in corporate elections.  In 
most public companies, the Big 4 are the largest stockholders and together comprise 
15% or more of the vote.18  BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street alone “constitute 
the single largest shareholder of at least 40% of all public companies in the U.S.” 
and “constitute[ ] the largest owner in nearly 90% of public companies in the S&P 
500.”19  Fidelity is a 5% stockholder in about a quarter of all publically traded 
companies.20  And their clout is enhanced because on most corporate governance 
                                                 
17 Of course, my focus on the Big 4 does not mean other large asset managers like T. Rowe Price, 
American Funds, Putman, or Bank of New York Mellon should not be accountable for addressing 
the problem I discuss.  But showing how important a change in behavior by the Big 4 could be 
illustrates just how influential the huge mutual fund families holding Worker Investors’ capital 
could be in improving the integrity of our political process. 
18 Coates, The Problem of Twelve, supra note 14, at 13 (“The ‘Big Three,’ as they are known – 
Vanguard, State Street, and BlackRock – controlled approximately 15% of the S&P 500 in 2017 -
- a much greater share of US public companies than any three single investors have ever previously 
done.”).   
19 John Morley, Too Big to Be Activist, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3–
4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3225555 
20 Id. 
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issues, these families vote all their funds identically, and not on a fund-specific 
basis.21  They do so based on arguments that their position on the issue is the one 
most favorable to long-term investors in general.22  
If the Big 4 flexes its voting muscles, it controls the swing votes and can 
galvanize corporate America to bend to its will.23  In other words, if the Big 4 unite 
on a corporate governance policy and support its adoption across the board, it will 
                                                 
21 Ying Duan & Yawen Jiao, The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance:  Evidence from 
Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior, 51 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 489, 
498 n.13 (2014) (“Less than 7% of our sample deviates from unanimous family voting . . . .”).   
22 See, e.g., BlackRock Investment Stewardship Engagement Priorities for 2018 *2 (Mar. 2018), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-stewardship-2018-priorities-
final.pdf (“BlackRock, as a fiduciary investor, undertakes all investment stewardship engagements 
and proxy voting with the goal of protecting and enhancing the long-term value of our clients’ 
assets.”); Protecting Our Clients’ Assets for the Long Term (BlackRock), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-us/investment-stewardship (“The BlackRock 
Investment Stewardship team is a centralized resource for portfolio managers.  In our stewardship 
work we aim to: [1] Protect and enhance the value of clients’ assets through engagement with 
companies [2] Encourage business and management practices that support sustainable financial 
performance over the long term [3] Provide specialist insight on environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) considerations to all investment strategies, whether indexed or actively 
managed.”); Susanne Craig, The Giant of Shareholders, Quietly Stirring (N.Y. Times, May 18, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/business/blackrock-a-shareholding-giant-is-quietly-
stirring.html (“Ms. Edkins [head of BlackRock’s Stewardship team] oversees 20 or so people 
covering thousands of companies around the world, and BlackRock says they make their own 
decisions — regardless of the views of the firm’s portfolio managers or even Mr. Fink 
[BlackRock’s CEO].”).      
23 Coates, supra note 18, at *1 (“Index funds increasingly possess the ‘median vote’ in corporate 
contests.”).   
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become the market standard, as issues like classified boards, poison pills, and so-
called majority voting demonstrate.24  When the Big 4 act together, they get their 
way.25  For example, when Blackrock and Vanguard supported a stockholder 
proposal requiring greater disclosure from Exxon on environmental risk, that 
proposal passed.26  
                                                 
24 See 2018 Spencer Stuart Board Index, SPENCERSTUART 15 (2018), available at 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2018/october/ssbi_2018.pdf (92% of S&P 500 boards 
have declassified boards; 89% of boards have majority voting); Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 13, 
at 44 (“The Big Three have consistently supported shareholder proposals to adopt governance 
arrangements that they view as beneficial, and they continue to do so.  For example, each of the 
Big Three has consistently voted for shareholder proposals seeking to replace staggered boards 
with annual elections.  And the Big Three’s voting guidelines indicate that they will generally vote 
in support of proposals to introduce annual elections, majority voting, and proxy access.”) 
(citations omitted); see also Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities 5–8, BLACKROCK  (Feb. 
2018) (Blackrock’s policy supports annual board elections and majority voting and opposes 
antitakeover devices); Vanguard’s Proxy Voting Guidelines, 
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/policies-and-guidelines/ (Vanguard’s policy 
supports annual board elections and opposes shareholder rights plan longer than one year without 
shareholder approval); Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines: North America, STATE STREET, 
(Mar. 2018), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-
governance/2018/03/Proxy-Voting-and-Engagement-Guidelines-NA-20180301.pdf (State 
Street’s policy supports annual board elections and majority voting but opposes antitakeover 
devices). 
25 But, distinguished scholars note, the Big 4 does not propose policy, it votes on the proposals of 
others, an arguably key gap in their stewardship role.  Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 13 at *44 
(“[O]ur review of the almost-4,000 shareholder proposals submitted from 2008 to 2017 did not 
identify a single proposal submitted by any of the Big Three.”).   
26 Similar proposals without the support of the Big 4 did not fare as well.  For example, in 2017, 
90 “climate-change related” proposals were put to a stockholder vote, but only three proposals 
received majority support.  BlackRock and Vanguard only supported two proposals—at Exxon 
Mobile and Occidental Petroleum—and both of those proposals were among the three proposals 
that received majority support.  See Rob Berridge, Four Mutual Fund Giants Begin to Address 
Climate Change Risks in Proxy Votes: How About Your Funds? (CERES, Dec. 21, 2017), 
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In sum, the Big 4 have recently been more willing to second-guess corporate 
management, advocate for change, and vote their shares in a skeptical and 
independent way.27  Their increasing power has its own risks,28 but also has 
enormous power to align corporate behavior with the interests of Worker Investors.  
                                                 
https://www.ceres.org/news-center/blog/four-mutual-fund-giants-begin-address-climate-change-
risks-proxy-votes-how-about. 
27 Despite the Big 4’s increasing willingness to question management, reject management 
proposals, and support activist investors, some scholars contend that the Big 4 are still largely pro-
management.  Professors Bebchuk and Hirst, for instance, point out that, on average, BlackRock, 
State Street, and Vanguard support over 97% of say-on-pay votes.  Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 
13, at *42.  Data from the Investment Company Institute (“ICI”) backs up their findings.  During 
the 2017 Proxy Season, mutual fund managers supported 93.8% of management’s proxy proposal 
though, as the ICI points out, such large support is misleading because “the vast majority of those 
proposals (81 percent) are routine votes on uncontested elections of directors or ratification of a 
company’s audit firm.”  Morris Mitler, Sean Collins & Dorothy Donohue, Funds and Proxy 
Voting:  Funds Vote Thoughtfully and Independently (ICI, Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_18_proxy_voting_results.  But when it comes to the most 
contested and important votes, such as proxy contests, the Big 4 are flexing their muscles.  See 
note 7 (collecting sources).  And on other pro-management policies—such as staggered boards 
and stockholder rights plans—the Big 4 are decidedly skeptical of management.  See Bebchuk & 
Hirst, supra note 13, at *44 (“[E]ach of the Big Three has consistently voted for shareholder 
proposals seeking to replace staggered boards with annual elections.  And the Big Three’s voting 
guidelines indicate that they will generally vote in support of proposals to introduce annual 
elections, majority voting, and proxy access.”).   
28 In a thought-provoking article, Professor Coates notes that control of corporate America now 
essentially resides in about the 12 largest institutional investors and that this poses the risk that the 
institutions may use their power to the detriment of society, if their power is not appropriately 
regulated.  With this risk comes promise, as this excerpt well illustrates:  “The bottom line of this 
influence is very different than what the term ‘passive’ investment implies.  Rather than blindly 
choosing stocks in their index and then ignoring them, index fund managers have and are 
increasingly using multiple channels to influence public companies of all sizes and kinds. Their 
views on governance issues, their opinions of CEOs, their desires for change at particular 
companies, their response and evaluations of restructuring or recapitalization proposals from 
hedge fund activists – all of these matter intensely to the way the core institutions in the U.S. 
economy are operating.” Coates, supra note 14, at *18–19. 
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But only if that power is wielded in a thoughtful way that represents Worker 
Investors’ interests.   And, as to the issue of corporate political spending, the Big 4 
have abdicated their representative role to Worker Investors and allowed corporate 
managers to act without constraint; remaining docile and deferential toward 
management in an old-school way.   
B.  The Big 4’s Perplexing Total Deference to Managers on Political Spending 
Is abdicate a strong word?  Yes.  Is it unfair?  No.  In the key area of corporate 
political spending, the Big 4 have opted for a policy of total deference to 
management.  Blackrock has a formal investment policy that defers to management 
on political issues:  It “believe[s] that it is not the role of shareholders to suggest or 
approve corporate political activities” therefore it “generally do[es] not support 
proposals requesting a shareholder vote on political activities or expenditures.”29  
                                                 
29 Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities 14, BLACKROCK (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-
guidelines-us.pdf.   
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Vanguard, by contrast, will consider each proposal, but will only support those that 
have “a logically demonstrable linkage between the specific proposal and long-term 
shareholder value of the company.”30  State Street’s policy is similar to 
Vanguard’s,31 and Fidelity does not have any policy on political spending.32  In 
essence, the voting policies of the Big 4 leave the question of political spending 
entirely to corporate management.  In fact, the Big 4 generally will not even vote to 
require corporations to disclose what they spend on politics, leaving the Big 4 and 
others largely blind to what is going on.  In 2018, Vanguard and Fidelity supported 
no political spending disclosure proposals; BlackRock supported only 4.1% of such 
                                                 
30 Polices and Guidelines VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/investment-
stewardship/policies-and-guidelines/ 
31 Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines:  North America (United States & Canada) *8 (State 
Street, 2018), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-
governance/2018/03/Proxy-Voting-and-Engagement-Guidelines-NA-20180301.pdf 
32 Though on other similar matters—like environmental and social issues—Fidelity has adopted a 
policy of total deference, in line with their voting behavior on political spending.  See Fidelity 
Funds’ Proxy Voting Guidelines, FIDELITY (Jan. 2018), https://www.fidelity.com/bin-
public/060_www_fidelity_com/documents/Full-Proxy-Voting-Guidelines-for-Fidelity-Funds-
Advised-by-FMRCo-and-SelectCo.pdf (“Fidelity generally will vote in a manner consistent with 
management’s recommendation on shareholder proposals concerning environmental or social 
issues, as it generally believes that management and the board are in the best position to determine 
how to address these matter.”).   
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proposals.33  And their 2018 voting patterns are not aberrational.  For the last 5 years, 
Blackrock, Fidelity, and Vanguard supported almost no proposals to mandate that 
corporations disclose their political spending.34  But, to be fair, State Street has done 
far better, supporting a majority of these proposals over the years.35   
                                                 
33 See Mutual Fund Support for Corporate Political Disclosure Surges *3 (Ctr. For Political 
Accountability, Nov. 27, 2018), http://files.politicalaccountability.net/reports/cpa-reports/CPA_-
_Mutual_Fund_Proxy_Voting_Analysis_-_2018.pdf. 
34 The Center for Political Accountability (CPA) has compiled data on mutual fund family voting 
on political spending proposals based on their model resolution for the last few years.  Data can 
be found at http://politicalaccountability.net/reports/cpa-reports. 
35 According to data from the CPA, State Street supported 54% of Corporate Political Disclosure 
Resolutions based on the CPA model in 2015, 55% of these proposals in 2016, 74% of these 
proposals in 2017, and 39% of these proposals in 2018.  See id.  The Big 4’s voting policies on 
proposals to require disclosure of political spending are also out of step with ISS and Glass Lewis, 
the two largest proxy advisory services in America.  Both ISS and Glass Lewis “[g]enerally vote 
for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s political contributions.”  United States:  
Proxy voting Guidelines *63 (ISS, Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf; see also 
In-Depth:  Corporate Political Spending *1 (Glass Lewis, Apr. 2018), 
http://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017-In-Depth-Report-Corporate-
Political-Spending.pdf (“Glass Lewis believes that a thoughtful disclosure and oversight policy 
regarding a company’s political contributions, developed and overseen by the board, is an 
important component of corporate accountability.”). 
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III.  Forced Capitalists:  Why Worker Investors Give Their Money to the 
Big 4 
 This abdication is especially troubling when we understand why the Big 4 can 
be given that name.  It is because of their success in securing favored positions within 
the 401(k) and 529 programs that Worker Investors must use to save for retirement 
and college.36  This influence has not resulted from a sudden recognition on the part 
of American workers that they like giving a substantial part of their earnings over to 
others to hold for generations until they can regain access when they approach 60.  
The mutual fund industry is federally subsidized because powerful tax incentives 
require American workers to become “forced capitalists,”37 with little choice but to 
                                                 
36 Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions:  A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate 
Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 537 (2011) (“Stock ownership is 
no longer a voluntary activity . . . . The rapid rise in stock ownership has been fueled by the 
proliferation of defined-contribution retirement plans provided by employers.”).  See also Ronald 
J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:  Activist Investors and 
the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863, 874 (2013) (In 1980, “institutional 
investors held 28.4% of U.S. equities.  By 2009, institutional investors held 50.6% of all U.S. 
public equities, and 73% of the equity of the thousand largest.”).   
37 See Leo E. Strine, Jr. Toward Common Sense and Common Ground?  Reflections on the Shared 
Interest of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. 
L. 1, 4 (2007) (“As a result of these changing dynamics [the decline of defined benefit plans and 
the rise of 401(k)s], most ordinary Americans have little choice but to invest in the market.  They 
are in essence ‘forced capitalists,’ even though they continue to depend for their economic security 
on their ability to sell their labor and to have access to quality jobs. These forced capitalists—in 
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give over funds every month to institutional investors.38  Worker Investors typically 
do not get to pick and choose stocks in their 401(k), they get to choose among mutual 
funds, often within specific fund families.39  And because Worker Investors do not 
control the underlying investments, they do not vote at the underlying portfolio 
companies.  That voting is left to the Big 4.  Plus, the reality is that there is no 
comparable stockholder litigation, proxy fights, or other activism in the mutual fund 
space.40  An accountability framework of that kind just does not exist.     
                                                 
whose number I count myself—invest primarily for two purposes, both of which are long-term in 
focus: to send their children to college and to provide for themselves in retirement.”).   
38 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?:  A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on 
Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1877–
78 (2017).  This influence has not resulted from a sudden recognition on the part of American 
workers that they like giving a substantial part of their earnings over to others to hold for 
generations until they can regain access when they approach 60.  Tucker, Flawed Assumptions, 
supra note 36, at 537 (“Stock ownership is no longer a voluntary activity . . . . The rapid rise in 
stock ownership has been fueled by the proliferation of defined-contribution retirement plans 
provided by employers.”). 
39 Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification:  The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees 
and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L. J. 1476, 1485 (2015) (noting that “[t]he 
most common type of investment options in 401(k) plans are mutual funds” and that “[a] typical 
401(k) menu provides around fourteen investment options” most of which are mutual funds); 
Strine, supra note 38, at 1878 (“The workers’ version of the Wall Street rule involves not being 
able to sell one stock in the Russell 3000 and buy another, or to move into particular bonds.  
Instead, it involves being able to move from one fund to another, often of the same fund family.”).   
40 See generally Quinn Curtis & John Morley, The Flawed Mechanics of Mutual Fund Fee 
Litigation, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2014); John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights 
Seriously:  Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84 
(2010).   
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And exit is illusory; their capital is trapped.  Because Worker Investors cannot 
take out their money without Castro-like expropriation until age 59 and a half,41 they 
have to give this money over to the institutional investor industry for generations.  
Likewise, savings for college by parents is now done virtually the same way.42   
    
                                                 
41 See I.R.C. § 72(t)(A)(i).  The same is true for IRAs.  See id. § 408A(d)(2)(A)(i).   
42 Most college savings plans—529 plans—provide participants with a choice of mutual funds to 
invest in, and withdrawals are tax disfavored except for any education expenditure.  See An 
Introduction to 529 Plans, SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION (Jan. 6, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/intro529.htm 
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IV.  The Double Legitimacy Problem In Corporate Political Spending 
 
A.  The First Layer:  Mutual Funds Don’t Have Worker Investors’ Capital 
for Political Reasons 
These realities bring us to the dual-layered, “double legitimacy” problem that 
infects political spending by public corporations.  In a crucial sense, the reticence of 
the Big 4 to get involved in whether corporations should engage in political spending 
reflects a healthy self-awareness but, and this but is important, in a “half-woke” way.  
The Big 4 understand that they have no legitimacy in representing their clients’ 
“political viewpoints” for an obvious reason:  Worker Investors do not invest in 
mutual funds for political expression.43  
Rather, they invest for retirement and college.  Thus, Worker Investors all 
share a need for durable long-term returns, which requires sound economic growth.  
Likewise, as to the need for public companies to create good jobs for Americans, 
                                                 
43 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 
101 GEORGETOWN L. J. 923, 942 (2013) (“Shareholders do not sort themselves among companies 
according to political preferences.”).   
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Worker Investors have common interests.  Worker Investors derive most of their 
income and most of their ability to accumulate wealth, from their status as laborers, 
not as capitalists.  On average, Americans get 79% of their income from wages and 
retirement payments, and “for all but the highest income group” “compensation is 
the largest source of income” for Americans.44  Thus, for most Worker Investors, 
their ability to put their kids through college and to have a secure retirement depends 
mostly on their access to a job, and their investments in equity capital are in fact just 
a surcharge on their incomes to fund those purposes.  Without a wage income, 
Worker Investors cannot invest and thus the way public companies make money 
matters to them in this sense.  Unless American public companies generate well-
                                                 
44 Joseph Rosenberg, Measuring Income for Distributional Analysis, URB.-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y 
CTR. 4–5 (July 25, 2013), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/measuring-income-
distributional-analysis/full (for all but the top 1% of income earners, Americans earn the majority 
of their income from their labor). 
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paying jobs for Worker Investors to hold, Worker Investors will not prosper and be 
economically secure.   
We also know that Worker Investors do not give their money to the Big 4 to 
invest for political purposes for another, banal reason:  that is not how these 
institutions advertise to attract investors.  Unsurprisingly, they advertise based on 
low fees and high returns.45     
                                                 
45 For example, an online ad for Vanguard notes that “[w]e have no outside owners, which helps 
us keep costs low.  In fact, the average expense ratio for Vanguard mutual funds and ETFs is 82% 
less than the industry average.”  See https://investor.vanguard.com/what-we-offer/why-vanguard; 
see also Dawn Lim, Vanguard Ratchets Up Index-Fund Price Battle (Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguard-ratchets-up-index-fund-price-battle-
1542636000?mod=djem10point (noting that “Vanguard Group is lowering the minimum amount 
customers need to invest to get cheaper prices on more than three dozen of its index funds”).  Sure, 
there are some funds that promote their social and environmental stewardship, but the bulk of 
American Worker Investors’ money flows into index and actively managed funds that attract 
investors on the promise of low fees or above average returns.  And the reality is that even these 
social and environmental funds vote the same way as the rest of the fund family.  Leo E. Strine, 
Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do The Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 250 
(2014) (documenting this reality and stating that “there are socially responsible investment funds 
that appear to vote their shares in line with all the other funds of their mutual fund family, and to 
take no special efforts to vote in a way that is consistent with the fund’s supposed commitment to 
social responsibility”).  A look at the up-to-date voting data suggests that the FTSE Social Index 
fund continues to vote in exactly the same manner as all other Vanguard funds.  Compare 
Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund, Form N-PX (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/supportingfiles/proxyvote0213.pdf?v=1506 
522482522, with Vanguard 500 Index Fund, Form N-PX (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://about.vanguard.com/investmentstewardship/supportingfiles/proxyvote0040.pdf?v=15065
22482519.  This behavior, which illustrates a large gap in stewardship, underscores the problem 
that the Big 4 have in claiming that they have the resolve to monitor political spending.   
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But that is where Worker Investors’ common interests end.  As to the larger 
range of policy choices that confront actual human beings who are citizens of a 
republic, there is no reason to believe that Worker Investors have similar views about 
issues like criminal justice, environmental regulation, or government support for the 
arts.  Rather, their views on these issues are likely as diverse as the American people 
themselves.   
For all these reasons, there is no logical or empirical basis to contend that 
American Worker Investors have a shared desire to allow S&P 500 CEOs to use 
their invested capital as their political proxies, much less that their investment in a 
mutual fund in their 401(k) signals that intention.  In fact, consistent poll data since 
Citizens United shows that a durable supermajority of Americans, and a majority of 
Americans of both major political parties, oppose the Supreme Court’s decision in 
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Citizens United.46  For instance, a 2018 poll found that “[l]iberals and conservatives 
overwhelmingly support a constitutional amendment that would effectively 
overturn” Citizens United, with “[t]hree-fourths of survey respondents—including 
66 percent of Republicans and 85 percent of Democrats—back[ing] a constitutional 
amendment outlawing Citizens United.”47  And a 2010 poll found that three-fourths 
of Americans—again regardless of political affiliation—thought that corporations 
“should get approval” from stockholders “before the corporation spends money to 
                                                 
46 For polling data from 2010 to 2018, see the following sources:  Ashley Balcerzak, Study:  Most 
Americans want to kill ‘Citizens United’ with Constitutional Amendment (Center for Public 
Integrity, May 10, 2018), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-05-10/study-most-americans-want-
kill-citizens-united-constitutional-amendment; Center for Public Integrity-Ipsos Campaign 
Finance Poll, https://www.publicintegrity.org/2017/08/31/21143/center-public-integrity-ipsos-
campaign-finance-poll; Cristian Farias, Americans Agree on One Thing:  Citizens United Is 
Terrible (Huffington Post, Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/citizens-united-
john-roberts_us_560acd0ce4b0af3706de129d; Lindsey Cook, SCOTUS-Hating Candidates 
Should Look in the Mirror to See What Americans Really Hate (U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 
2, 2015), https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/10/02/supreme-court-
disapproval-hits-new-high-gallup-polling-shows; Chris Geidner, New Poll:  Americans Think the 
Supreme Court is Political, Closed Off, and Got Citizens United Wrong (BuzzFeed, May 6, 2014), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/chrisgeidner/new-poll-americans-think-the-supreme-
court-is-political-clos#2ft2vel; Dan Eggen, Poll:  Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s 
Decision on Campaign Finance (Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html.    
47 Ashley Balcerzak, Study:  Most Americans want to kill ‘Citizens United’ with Constitutional 
Amendment (Center for Public Integrity, May 10, 2018), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-05-
10/study-most-americans-want-kill-citizens-united-constitutional-amendment. 
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support or oppose a candidate for elected office.”48  Therefore, if there is any political 
consensus among Worker Investors, it is that public corporations should not spend 
treasury funds to influence our nation’s politics.   
B.  The Second Layer:  Public Corporations Don’t Have Equity Capital 
Because They Are Instruments For Stockholder Political Sentiment  
 
When public companies use treasury funds for political purposes without 
stockholder approval, the “half woke” and “double legitimacy” problems come 
together.  The Big 4 are correct that they have no legitimacy to speak for their 
investors on matters of politics, as their investors do not invest for political reasons 
and do not share consistent political values.  But, that reality also applies to the Big 
4’s portfolio companies when it comes to political spending.  Just like the Big 4 do 
not have Worker Investors’ capital for political reasons, American public companies 
do not have the capital of the Big 4 for any reason related to politics.  Thus, public 
                                                 
48 Results of SurveyUSA News Poll #16270 at *6, 
http://www.surveyusa.com/client/PollPrint.aspx?g=05cabb5f-599f-47a8-98fb-e3e254e425e4. 
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corporations have as much of a legitimacy problem as the Big 4 itself when it comes 
to political spending, and the Big 4 are ignoring that reality.  Not only that, they are 
doing so in the face of the bipartisan consensus that corporate spending unauthorized 
by stockholders should not be permitted.   
This “double legitimacy” problem is dangerous for our Republic and for 
Worker Investors.49  Because it is difficult enough for stockholders to monitor 
corporate managers even for their effectiveness in the core domain of their 
businesses, corporate law scholars, and conservative ones in particular,50 have urged 
corporate law to focus on holding corporate managers accountable to stockholders 
                                                 
49 Even with increased stockholder activism and the reconcentration of voting power in fewer 
investors, there remains concern over the extent to which stockholders are holding corporate 
managers accountable for proper performance, even as to core issues of business.  Bebchuk & 
Hirst, supra note 13, at *6 (“[T]he Big Three’s votes on these matters [say-on-pay and proxy 
contests with activist hedge funds] reveals considerable deference to corporate managers.  For 
example, the Big Three rarely oppose corporate managers in say-on-pay votes, and are less likely 
than other investors to oppose managers in proxy fights against activists.”). 
50 See Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between 
Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 346–59 
(2016) (documenting conservative corporate law theory positing that directors and managers 
should focus on maximizing stockholder returns with the bounds of law).   
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solely for producing profits within the bounds of the law.51  These scholars argue 
that if corporate managers are allowed to justify their actions by reference to their 
desire to serve many ends, then they will be accountable for none.52  
 As important, these scholars contend that because stockholders themselves 
have no common political or philosophical shared interests, and only have a common 
interest in receiving a profitable return on their investments, corporate managers 
have no legitimate basis for using corporate funds to advance political or social 
                                                 
51 See e.g., 3 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY:  THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE 
PEOPLE 82 (1979) (“So long as the management has the one overriding duty of administering the 
resources under its control as trustees for the shareholders and for their benefit, its hands are largely 
tied; and it will have no arbitrary power to benefit this or that particular interest.  But once the 
management of a big enterprise is regarded as not only entitled but even obliged to consider in its 
decisions whatever is regarded as the public or social interest, or to support good causes and 
generally to act for the public benefit, it gains indeed an uncontrollable power—a power which 
could not long be left in the hands of private managers but would inevitably be made the subject 
of increasing public control.”); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to 
Increase Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33 (“In a free-enterprise, private-property 
system, a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct 
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with 
their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the 
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”).  
52 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management 
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1191–92 (1981) (“A manager 
responsible to two conflicting interests is in fact answerable to neither.”). 
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causes.53  For that reason, these scholars argue that if the firm has extra funds that it 
does not need to make products or deliver services for a profit, then it should return 
them to stockholders.  That is especially so if the firm has surplus for political or 
social spending, because the stockholders have diverse views on those subjects and 
if the surplus is returned to them, they can decide for themselves whether and how 
to spend those funds on social and political causes.54  But because of the trapped 
nature of Worker Investors’ savings, any surplus capital that corporations return to 
                                                 
53 Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office:  Shareholder Welfare and 
Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 
1224–25 (1999) (“[S]hareholders may have very different views on what is good for society.  Even 
if they do not, there is no reason to channel non-profit-maximizing charity through the firm.  The 
firm has no advantage—in greater benefits or lower costs—in making donations that profit-
maximization does not justify.”); Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 923, 961 (1984) (noting that the pursuit of objectives, besides profit maximization, 
is “especially disturbing because profit maximization is the only goal for which we can at least 
theoretically posit shareholder unanimity”).  
54 Friedman, supra note 51 at 33 (“In each of these cases, the corporate executive would be 
spending someone else’s money for a general social interest.  Insofar as his actions in accord with 
his ‘social responsibility’ reduce returns to stockholders, he is spending their money. Insofar as his 
actions raise the price to customers, he is spending the customers’ money.  Insofar as his actions 
lower the wages of some employees, he is spending their money.  The stockholders or the 
customers or the employees could separately spend their own money on the particular action if 
they wished to do so. The executive is exercising a distinct ‘social responsibility,’ rather than 
serving as an agent of the stockholders or the customers or the employees.”); Butler & McChesney, 
Why They Give at the Office, supra note 53 at 1223–24 (“Either the money goes to the shareholders 
(who own the residual claim), or the firm gives it away.  When managers engage in philanthropy 
that advances their own utility but not firm profits, they are giving away the shareholders’ 
money.”).  
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stockholders cannot be used by Worker Investors to engage in political expression 
themselves; rather the capital must be reinvested in mutual funds. 
C.  Two Layers; Neither Solid  
 We therefore have a problem that Worker Investors are at the mercy of one 
group of agents with conflicts of interest, institutional investors, to check another 
group of agents with conflicts of interest, public company management, as to an 
issue over which neither class of agent has legitimacy.  
 The hierarchy of voting now chosen by the Big 4 therefore seems almost 
upside down.  On business strategy, an issue on which corporate management is 
expert, institutional investors, who are generalists at best, are more willing than ever 
to voice their views and to support insurgent campaigns to change course.  Likewise, 
institutions have not been shy about asserting their own views about the appropriate 
provisions to put in corporate charters, bylaws, pay polices, and the like. 
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 Corporate managers are not selected because they best reflect the interests of 
stockholders on the full range of issues that would be relevant to running a polity, 
but because they are equipped to successfully manage a for-profit business.  But, on 
issues where corporate managers have far less comparative advantage than 
institutional investors, the institutional investors have reacted to their own lack of 
legitimacy by reticence, in the case of corporate social responsibility, and abdication, 
in the case of corporate political spending. 
D.  A Lack of Disclosure Means a Lack of Accountability  
 Now, one might say, is that really fair?  Haven’t some of the institutions said 
that they will act if a corporation’s political spending appears to be out of line with 
industry standards, or otherwise crosses some undetermined line of unacceptability?  
For sure that is true,55 but this raises another issue of blindness.   
                                                 
55 BlackRock Investment Stewardship:  Global Corporate Governance & Engagement Principles 
*7 (BlackRock, Oct. 2017), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-
responsible-investment-1engprinciples-global-122011.pdf (noting that BlackRock will engage 
with management on environmental, social, and political issues when in BlackRock’s “assessment 
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Scholars and institutions, such as NYU’s own Brennan Center, devoted to the 
documentation of money in our politics admit that they are unable to trace large 
amounts of the funds that influence our elections.56  Since the Judiciary gutted 
                                                 
[ ] there is potential for material economic ramifications for shareholders”); F. William McNabb 
III, Getting to Know You:  The Case for Significant Shareholder Engagement (Harv. Corp. Gov. 
Forum, June 24, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/24/getting-to-know-you-the-
case-for-significant-shareholder-engagement/ (noting that much of Vanguard’s engagement 
focuses on the reasons the company is an “outlier”); see also Catherine Dunn, Vanguard Is No 
Friend to Shareholders Seeking More Details on Firms’ Political Spending (Philadelphia Inquirer, 
Dec. 7, 2018), http://www2.philly.com/business/vanguard-blackrock-fidelity-political-spending-
donations-morningstar-votes-20181207.html (quoting a Vanguard spokesperson as saying that 
“Vanguard engages on topics ‘that we believe could affect our clients’ investments outcomes.  In 
addition to conducting corporate governance analysis, our investment stewardship team regulatory 
evaluates whether and where environmental, social or political risks could pose challenges to a 
company’s long-term performance’”). 
56 See, e.g., Money in Politics 101:  What You Need to Know About Campaign Finance After 
Citizens United Brennan Ctr. for Justice (Sept. 28, 2012) (“But the amount of corporate spending 
cannot be fully determined because of tax-exempt groups that do not disclose their donors.  An 
investigation by the New York Times uncovered several large contributions by corporations to 
tax-exempt groups, including six- and seven-figure contributions from American Electric Power, 
Aetna, Prudential Financial, Dow Chemical, Merck, Chevron and MetLife.  By donating to non-
profits, corporations can avoid shareholder criticism about using revenues for political purposes 
as well as consumer reaction to their political stance.  Consequently, it is reasonable to suspect 
that, because of non-profits’ ability to hide donations, they are the preferred vehicle for corporate 
political spending.”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate 
Political Spending 101 GEORGETOWN L.J. 923, 927 (2013) (“We present evidence indicating that 
public companies engage in substantial political spending through these intermediaries.  
Furthermore, although other types of corporate spending on politics are occasionally disclosed in 
public filings, collecting the information necessary to identify the amount or targets of a public 
company’s spending would require a review of a wide range of disparate sources.  As a result, it 
is currently impractical for a public company’s investors to have a complete picture of the 
company’s political spending.”); See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., James D. Nelson 
& Roberto Tallarita, The Untenable Case for Keeping Investors in the Dark, *9, 14 [(Working 
Paper, Nov. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3281791 (“Under 
existing rules, however, disclosure of corporate political spending is incomplete and often 
misleading . . . . [C]urrent law requires relatively little disclosure of corporate spending on politics.  
For one thing, corporations can channel significant political spending through intermediaries, and 
such spending largely remains under investors’ radar.”).   
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McCain-Feingold, there has been an enormous growth in “Social Welfare 
Organizations” under 501(c)(4) and other vehicles, which spend enormous amounts 
on the sly to elect or defeat specific candidates or ballot issues.57  These 
organizations are the least likely to disclose their source of funding, and about which 
the least is known.  The best-known example may be the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce,58 which has spent over $130 million on politics from 2010 to 2016.  The 
Chamber does not have to disclose its donors and does not, although nearly 100 blue-
chip companies are “members.”59  I do not mean to single out the Chamber.  But 
                                                 
57 See Political Nonprofits (Dark Money) Ctr. For Responsive Politics, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/nonprof_summ.php (showing that Social Welfare 
Organizations are by far the largest dark money spenders).   
58 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is a 501(c)(6) organization.  These organizations must disclose 
their members if, over the course of a year, it spends more than $250 expressly advocating for the 
election or defeat of a particular political candidate.  See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c).  But if these 
organizations give to other organizations that advocate for a particular candidate on their behalf, 
that disclosure is not required.  The Pharmaceutical example with Senator Orin Hatch below is a 
good example of organizations giving to other organizations for the purposes of hiding the true 
funders.  See text accompanying infra note 61. 
59 Michael Beckel, Dark Money Illuminated *7 (IssueOne 2018), https://www.issueone.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/Dark-Money-Illuminated-Report.pdf. 
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business interests are predominate in this political dark space and many spend their 
money in a less open way than the Chamber.60   
And the spending by these groups can be targeted and hidden.  For example, 
in the summer of 2011, a group harmlessly named “Freedom Path” started spending 
money to ward off a primary challenge to an incumbent U.S. Senator.  It worked; he 
won re-election.  Only in November, after his reelection, did it become clear that 
                                                 
60 Excluding 501 organizations, which themselves are usually pools of dark money, corporations 
represented 70% of dark money spending according to Issue One’s database.  Issue One’s database 
is available at:  https://www.issueone.org/dark-money/.  See also id. (“Companies . . . are among 
the donors identified [as donors to dark money organizations] by this research . . . . Issue One 
found that nearly 100 bluechip companies have voluntarily disclosed their own dues payments to 
the trade association. The Dow Chemical Co. alone has contributed about $13.5 million to the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce in recent years, while health insurer Aetna Inc. has contributed $5.3 million 
and oil giant Chevron Corp. has contributed $4.5 million.  Meanwhile, Issue One found that gun 
manufacturer Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. has contributed more than $12 million in recent years to 
the National Rifle Association, while tobacco company Reynolds American Inc. has contributed 
substantial sums to three major dark money groups in recent years:  $275,000 to Americans for 
Tax Reform, $61,000 to Americans for Prosperity and at least $50,000 to the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce.”); Ian Vandewalker, One Million Opinions on Transparency in Corporate Political 
Spending (Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/one-
million-opinions-transparency-corporate-political-spending (observing that, after Citizens United, 
“[c]orporations have taken advantage of weakened regulations” to spend money on politics, but 
noting that “we have no idea how much corporations really spend, because much outside money 
in elections is ‘dark money,’ the sources of which are hidden from the public); Nicholas 
Confessore, Secret Money Fueling a Flood of Political Ads (N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/us/politics/ads-paid-for-by-secret-money-flood-the-
midterm-elections.html (noting that corporations are “would rather mask their commercial interest 
in making [political] contributions” than other political contributors). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3304611 
36 
“Freedom Path” was a bunch of pharmaceutical companies, acting through a trade 
association called Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.61  
Spending by groups like this has even crept into state judicial elections, with oil and 
gas interests spending big in Montana’s 2012 Supreme Court election for example.  
Unsurprisingly, these oil and gas companies are frequent litigants in Montana state 
courts.62  The extent to which corporate and other funds are involved in the huge 
increase in spending from dark money groups to influence elections is not fully 
determined, and there is no easy or reliable means to trace the spending of any 
specific corporation. 
E.  The Big 4’s Failure to Press for Disclosure and How Their Vote Would 
Change the Tide  
 
                                                 
61 Michael Beckel, Dark Money Illuminated *3 (IssueOne 2018), https://www.issueone.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/Dark-Money-Illuminated-Report.pdf. 
62 Alicia Bannon, Cathleen Lisk, and Peter Hardin, Who Pays for Judicial Races *24 (Brennan 
Center for Justice at NYU), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Politics_of_Judicial_Elections_Fin
al.pdf 
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 In response to this rise in dark money and corporate political spending, 
stockholders seeking to constrain the ability of corporate managers to engage in 
political spending without fair accountability have rationally demanded disclosure.63  
Tell us, they ask, to what extent and to what end have you spent corporate funds on 
politics? 
 Despite having policies of abdication subject only to action to prevent political 
spending that seems to cross some line of unacceptability in amount or form, the Big 
4 have generally failed to support initiatives to give them the very information that 
would be necessary for them to determine whether their own policies demand that 
they step up.64  For instance, in 2011, when the SEC was considering mandating 
                                                 
63 The argument for required disclosure of corporate political spending has been made well by 
several distinguished commentators.  See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., 
Corporate Political Speech:  Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); John C. Coates IV, 
Corporate Speech & The First Amendment:  History, Data and Implications, 30 CONST. COMM. 
223 (2015); John C. Coates IV & Taylor Lincoln, Fulfilling Kennedy’s Promise:  Why the SEC 
Should Mandate Disclosure of Corporate Political Activity (Working Paper, Sept. 8, 2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1923804.  
64 In fact, in Citizens United v. FEC, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, implicitly assumed 
that access to information about corporate political spending would be accessible and allow 
stockholders to correct abuses “though the procedures of corporate democracy.”  558 U.S. 310, 
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political spending disclosures for public companies, several asset managers signed 
a letter in support of the rule.65  But none of the Big 4 did.66   
 And stockholder proposals requesting greater political transparency will not 
succeed without the Big 4’s votes.  A recent study of 25 political spending disclosure 
proposals found that only one passed.  But if the largest stockholders had voted for 
these proposals, 15 more would have a passed—over half the proposals would have 
gained majority support if just the largest investors—including the Big 4—supported 
them.67  By deferring to management, the Big 4 have handcuffed their own ability 
                                                 
362 (2010).  And Citizens United upheld disclosure requirements as constitutional.  Id. at 372.  
Therefore, our failure to mandate disclosure in a post-Citizens United world underscores the 
problem facing the country that can be uniquely solved by the Big 4.   
65 Letter to Elizabeth M. Murphy (Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-
11.pdf. 
66 Id.   
67 Majority Report:  If Mutual Fund Companies Changed Their Votes, Shareholder Support for 
Political Spending Disclosure Would Skyrocket *3 (Public Citizen, May 3 2017), 
https://corporatereformcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Majority-Report-2017.pdf.  
Allstate provides an apt recent example.  The Teamsters placed a political spending disclosure 
proposal on Allstate’s 2018 proxy.  After all the votes were counted, the proposal narrowly failed, 
with 46.5% of stockholders supporting the proposal.  But Vanguard, Blackrock, and State Street 
all voted “no.”  These three institutions are the three largest Allstate stockholders and if just one 
of them had voted “for” the proposal, it would have passed. 
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to oversee political spending by denying themselves the very data they need to do 
so.    
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V.  The Big 4’s Lack of Capacity to Monitor Political Spending Practices  
 
 Not only do the Big 4 lack the information to monitor political spending, they 
also lack the capacity to do so.  There is a lively debate about whether the Big 4 are 
doing enough to be active stewards, even in the core area of overseeing portfolio 
company business performance.68  The Big 4 must vote on stockholder proposals, 
directors, and pay plans at thousands of companies annually.69  To be fair, the Big 4 
                                                 
68 Compare Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 
(2018) (advocating that passive investors—like the Big 4—should be precluded from voting 
because they cannot be adequate stewards of capital), with Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 13, 
(encouraging policy positions that would provide more incentives for passive investors—like the 
Big 4—to be active in corporate governance and worrying that the Big 4’s current approach is too 
deferential to management), Jill E. Fisch & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration (Penn 
Law & Econ Research Paper no. 18-22), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3227113 (arguing that the Big 4 collaborate 
already with their portfolio companies to achieve long-term returns and arguing that this type of 
collaboration or engagement is the best way for the Big 4 to add value to both Worker Investors 
and their portfolio companies), Edward B. Rock & Marcel Kahan, Index Funds and Corporate 
Governance:  Let Shareholders be Shareholders (NYU Law & Econ. Research Paper, Dec. 5, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295098 (arguing that the Big 3 have 
enough financial incentives to be actively involved and engaged in corporate governance and key 
proxy contests).  
69 For instance, BlackRock must vote on directors, compensation, and stockholder proposals at 
about 14,000 companies around the world.  Vanguard and State Street are asked to monitor a 
similar number of corporations.  See Lund, supra note 68, at 516–17 (“Vanguard employs fifteen 
people devoted to engagement and voting at about 13,000 companies based around the world, 
BlackRock employs about twenty people who work on governance issues at some 14,000 
companies, and State Street employs fewer than ten people devoted to governance issues at around 
9,000 companies.”). 
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have recently increased their focus on stewardship and expanded their stewardship 
teams.70  But the Big 4 still don’t have enough staff for monitoring, even when it 
comes to questions of core business policy.  For instance, as of 2017, Blackrock had 
a team of 33 responsible for engagement at over 14,000 companies—that is over 400 
companies per team member.71  At Fidelity, every year their “portfolio managers and 
analysts attend more than 17,000 company meetings—or one every 10 minutes on 
average.”72  And recent analysis by Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst 
shows that BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street spend “less than 3.5 person-days 
each year, and less than $4,000 in stewardship costs, to oversee [each] billion-dollar 
                                                 
70 Madison Marriage, BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street Bulk Up Governance Staff (Fin. 
Times, Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/657b243c-e492-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a. 
71 Passive Fund Providers Take an Activist Approach to Investment Stewardship 19, 
MORNINGSTAR (Dec. 2017), 
https://www.morningstar.com/content/dam/marketing/shared/pdfs/Research/Morningstar-
Passive-Active-Stewardship.pdf (“For example, BlackRock expanded its team to 33 members 
today from 20 in 2014, Vanguard’s team went to 21 today from 10 in 2015.”); Dorothy S. Lund, 
The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 516–17 (2018) (“The Big Three 
advertise that their governance groups are active participants in firm governance, but a closer look 
induces some skepticism about these claims.  Those governance groups do not have their pay tied 
to the funds’ performance.  They are also understaffed.”).  At Fidelity, every year their “portfolio 
and analysts attend more than 17,000 company meetings—or one every 10 minutes on average.”  
About Us, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelityinternational.com/global/about/default.page.  
72 About Us, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelityinternational.com/global/about/default.page.    
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investment” they own.73  It’s easy to see why the Big 4 themselves, in candid 
moments, bemoan the proliferation of votes and the impossibility of being informed 
as to all of them. 
Given the tremendous task the Big 4 face in monitoring their thousands of 
portfolio companies’ business policies, just what incentives and capacity do they 
have to monitor these companies’ political spending practices?  In making this point, 
I am not blaming the fund families.  But if they in fact do not monitor in this area 
because they lack adequate incentives and capacity to do so, their stated policies 
about political spending make no logical sense, and leave corporate managers free 
to act without accountability in an area where they lack legitimacy. 
And although the Big 4 have increased their private engagement with 
companies,74 the Big 4 don’t meet with most of their portfolio companies annually.  
                                                 
73 Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 13 at *34.   
74 See Glenn H. Booraem, Passive Investors, not Passive Owners, VANGUARD (June 20, 2013), 
https://global.vanguard.com/portal/site/institutional/ch/en/articles/research-and-
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For about 90% of portfolio companies, Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street have 
zero engagement—not even one single meeting.75  And even when they do privately 
engage, Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street tend to meet with a portfolio 
company only once a year.76  Given these realities, it seems improbable that political 
spending will be a subject covered at these meetings. 
  
                                                 
commentary/topical-insights/passive-investors-passive-owners-tlorins (“However, by its nature, 
voting reduces often complex issues to a binary choice—between FOR and AGAINST a particular 
proposal—making the proxy vote a rather blunt instrument.  This is where the second—and 
perhaps more important—component of our governance program takes over; engagement with 
directors and management of the companies in which we invest provides for a level of nuance and 
precision that voting, in and of itself, lacks.  So while voting is visible, it tells only part of the story.  
We believe that engagement is where the action is.  We have found through hundreds of direct 
discussions every year that we are frequently able to accomplish as much—or more—through 
dialogue as we are through voting.  Importantly, through engagement, we are able to put issues on 
the table for discussion that aren’t on the proxy ballot.  We believe that our active engagement on 
all manner of issues demonstrates that passive investors don’t need to be passive owners.”). 
75 Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 13, at *38.   
76 Id. 
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VI.  Reasons Why Political Spending Does Not Benefit Diversified Investors 
 
 Now, of course, some would argue that most corporate political spending is 
likely intended to help elect candidates supporting the corporation’s desired 
regulatory policies, policies that the firm’s managers believe will help the firm 
maintain or increase its profits.  On that basis, why should institutional investors act 
to constrain spending as spending that increases firm profits is good for investors?  
Well, for many good reasons.   
A.  Disclosure as a First Step  
 For starters, institutions that have no idea how much their portfolio companies 
spend on politics, and on what, are in no position to invoke this argument.  It is an 
argument based on ignorance, not a sound empirical basis.  In the S&P 500, 48% of 
companies provide no political spending disclosure, and even companies that do 
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disclose some information have loopholes in their disclosure policies “that allow 
them to withhold certain information that shareholders would expect to receive.”77 
  B.  Worker Investors Are Hurt by Externalities and Do Not Benefit from 
Rent Seeking  
 And for diversified investors any increased profitability by particular 
corporations that results from externalities is suffered by them both as Worker 
Investors and as human citizens who pay taxes, breathe air, and have values not 
synonymous with lucre.   
 The colder economic term externalities can be put in the more human terms 
of dirtier water and air, workers who suffer death or harm at an unsafe workplace, 
employees whose health care needs to be covered by the government or a spouse’s 
more responsible employer, or defrauded or injured consumers.  All of them are 
costs that Worker Investors bear as taxpayers, human victims, and as diversified 
                                                 
77 Bebchuk et al., supra note 56, at *31 
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investors.78  In other words, Worker Investors are not in on the swindle that results 
when an industry, think big tobacco, is able to make profits by shifting its costs of 
harm to others.79 
 As important, because Worker Investors are dependent on real, sustainable 
economic growth, they are harmed when businesses use the political process to 
engage in rent-seeking to protect their industries against competition from other 
competitors with cleaner, more responsible ways of making money, or to hold off 
                                                 
78 Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1117 (2002) (“On this view, as with corporate 
charitable giving--which no one seems eager to proscribe despite the existence of the very same 
agency problem--there may well be a corporate profit-maximizing and therefore pro-shareholder 
rationale for corporate political speech.  To be fair, however, it should be noted that well-
diversified shareholders might not appreciate this approach to profit maximization.  Well-
diversified investors are equally as likely to be on the losing side as the winning side of a 
redistributive battle between incorporated firms, so on average they would be worse off because 
the transfer costs represent a deadweight loss.”).   
79 Jay B. Kesten, Shareholder Political Primacy, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 161, 209 (2016) 
(“[M]anagers have strong incentives to engage in corporate political activity to rent-seek if doing 
so would maximize their own firm’s value.  However, rational, diversified investors should curtail 
that activity if the rent-seeking results in intra-portfolio wealth transfers.  Because rent-seeking is 
not costless, the transaction costs constitute a deadweight loss.  Empowering shareholders to 
regulate corporate political activity would allow them to prevent such losses.  It may also insulate 
firms from losses associated with political extortion, a form of reverse rent-seeking in which 
politicians siphon off part of a company’s surplus by threatening to enact harmful legislation.”).   
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efforts by regulators to make them reduce the externalities they generate.80  
Corporate political spending that benefits particular competitors to the disadvantage 
of others does not benefit diversified investors, it retards sustainable growth and 
market competition.  Political spending designed to influence society to elect 
candidates who deny science and the relationship between carbon use and climate 
change is a good example.81  That kind of influence peddling is designed to 
                                                 
80 Anne Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Paradigm to Reflect How and 
Why A Majority of Americans Invest in the Market, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299, 1317–18 (2012) 
(“Because a mutual fund owner is invested in ‘the market’ or a representative sample of the whole, 
she may care more about overall growth and stability of the market rather than the performance of 
a specific firm.”).   
81 See, e.g., Bill McKibben, A Very Grim Forecast 6 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Nov. 22, 
2018), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/11/22/global-warming-very-grim-forecast/ 
(“Since the last IPCC report, a series of newspaper exposés has made it clear that the big oil 
companies knew all about climate change even before it became a public issue in the late 1980s, 
and that, instead of owning up to that knowledge, they sponsored an enormously expensive 
campaign to obfuscate the science . . . . After the release of the IPCC report, for instance, Exxon 
pledged $1 million to work toward a carbon tax.  That’s risible—Exxon made $280 billion in the 
last decade, and it has donated huge sums to elect a Congress that won’t pass a carbon tax anytime 
soon; oil companies are spending many millions of dollars to defeat a carbon tax on the ballot in 
Washington State and to beat back bans on fracking in Colorado.  Even if a carbon tax somehow 
made it past the GOP, the amount Exxon says it wants—$40 a ton—is tiny compared to what the 
IPCC’s analysts say would be required to make a real dent in the problem.  And in return the 
proposed legislation would relieve the oil companies of all liability for the havoc they’ve caused.  
A bargain that might have made sense a generation ago no longer counts for much.”).  Another 
prominent example is Chevron spending about $3 million to elect municipal candidates in 
Richmond, California who would not advocate for increased safety measures at Chevron’s refinery 
in Richmond, despite the fact that the refinery has had three major fires erupt in the last 25 years.  
See Alice Kantor, Progressives Capture City Hall and Council, Fending Off Chevron Money, 
Richmond Confidential (Nov. 5, 2014), http://richmondconfidential.org/2014/11/05/progressives-
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perpetuate large subsidies granted to traditional energy companies, and to thereby 
retard the growth of new businesses that generate energy in a way that uses less 
carbon and produces less pollution.  Not only does this privilege ossified businesses 
of the past over businesses with brighter prospects, it subjects our economy and thus 
diversified investors to the huge economic and social costs that will come from a 
failure to keep climate change within bounds.82  Professor John Coates has summed 
up the corporate rent-seeking race, nicely, worrying that the concerted efforts of big 
corporations to tilt the regulatory system in a direction that serves their selfish 
                                                 
capture-city-hall-and-council-fending-off-chevron-money/ (reporting that another candidate won 
the mayoral race against the Chevron-backed candidate); Heather Smith, In Richmond, Calif., It’s 
Chevron’s $3 Million vs. A Green Slate (Nov. 4, 2014), http://grist.org/politics/in-richmond-calif-
its-chevrons-3-million-vs-a-green-slate (discussing the absorbent amount spent by Chevron in 
Richmond, California). 
82 John Craig & David Madland, How Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Can Lead to 
Inefficient Economic Policy *1 (Center for American Progress, May 2, 2014), quoting Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality (W.W. Norton 2012) (“As Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph 
Stiglitz explains, rent-seeking not only wastes tax dollars on unnecessary or inefficient projects—
redistributing money from one part of society to the rent-seekers—but it is a ‘centripetal force’ 
that hollows out the economy because ‘the rewards of rent seeking become so outsize that more 
and more energy is directed toward it, at the expense of everything else.’”).  
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interests “risks economic harms -- a package of risks one could call (with some but 
only some exaggeration) ‘the risk of Russia.’”83   
                                                 
83 John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & The First Amendment:  History, Data, and Implications 
30 CONST. COMM. 223, 224 (2015) (“Nearly half of First Amendment legal challenges now benefit 
business corporations and trade groups, rather than other kinds of organizations or individuals. 
Such cases represent examples of a particular kind of corruption, defined here as a form of rent 
seeking: the use of legal tools by business managers in specific cases to entrench reregulation in 
their personal interests at the expense of shareholders, consumers, and employees, and in aggregate 
to degrade the rule of law by rendering law less predictable, general and clear.  This corruption not 
only risks the loss of a republican form of government emphasized by most critics of Citizens 
United, but also risks economic harms – a package of risks one could call (with some but only 
some exaggeration) ‘the risk of Russia.’”).  This type of corporate influence also raises questions 
about Worker Investors’ trust in our system of government and the role played by corporations—
seeking to maximize profits within the bounds of the law—and government—creating laws and 
regulations that protect society.  See Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 
VAND. L. REV. 639, 87–92 (2016) (“Notwithstanding the issue of political viability, this fix should 
be made [to RFRA] to preserve the equilibrium—a social compact—established in corporate law 
to rely on and require business corporations to comply with external regulations.  This allocation 
of roles for different areas of law has allowed corporate law to be enabling and value creating—
for corporations to serve as ‘great engines for the promotion of the public convenience, and for the 
development of public wealth.’”) (quoting Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 366 (N.Y. 1888)); Leo 
E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between 
Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 383 (2016) 
(“Citizens United undermines conservative corporate theory’s reliance upon the regulatory process 
as a safeguard against externality.  Because Citizens United permits the corporation to act directly 
to influence who is elected to office by using the huge resources in corporate treasuries, it is likely 
as a general matter to make candidates of all persuasions more beholden to corporate desires.  
Under conservative corporate theory, the only legitimate reason for a for-profit corporation to 
make political expenditures will be to elect or defeat candidates based on their support for policies 
that the corporation believes will produce the most profits.  Almost by definition, this will increase 
the danger of externality risk, because corporate expenditures will be made with the singular 
objective of stockholder profit in mind, and therefore will be likely to favor policies that leave the 
corporation with the profits from their operations, while shifting the costs of those operations 
(including of excessive risk taking or safety shortcuts) to others.”).   
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C.  Corporate Political Spending Is Unlikely to Even Benefit the Corporations 
Doing the Spending  
The increasing recognition by the Big 4 of the need for responsible, 
sustainable business practices actually accords with the logic of Professor Coates’s 
work and the arguments of others who contend that political spending by 
corporations is not likely to be wealth creating for society or even the corporations 
themselves in the long run.84  In focusing on corporate social responsibility, investors 
like Blackrock argue that corporations that cannot make money without taking 
ethical or regulatory shortcuts are unlikely to be profitable in the long run and that 
dubious action of that kind is a forensic indicator of a problematic business plan and 
culture.85  Logically, one would infer that there is a high correlation between public 
corporations that engage in problematic behavior and those that engage in spending 
to influence the political process.  Even from the narrow perspective of an investor 
                                                 
84 See John C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens 
United, 9 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 657, 658 (2012) (“In the majority of industries . . . political 
activity is common but varied, and it correlates negatively with . . . shareholder value.”). 
85 See text accompanying notes 8–12. 
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in an actively traded mutual fund with a smaller portfolio of stocks, there is strong 
reason to be concerned that corporate political spending is a warning signal for 
investors.  That, of course, should be unsurprising.  If a business has to try to make 
money by influencing the political process, that suggests that its prospects for growth 
by developing improved products and services are not strong.  Instead, the business 
apparently has to seek special favors to gain access to subsidies or government 
contracts, not on the basis of the merits alone, but by currying favor.  And, of course, 
there is the reality that one business’s successful rent-seeking can be a competitor’s 
loss, and your investment fund may also hold the loser as well as the winner.  Over 
time, therefore, it seems doubtful that influence-seeking is an optimal growth 
strategy.86   
                                                 
86 And companies face substantial business risks when they spend their capital on politics, as 
customers may boycott companies whose politics are perceived as being out-of-sync with their 
own.  See generally Collision Course:  The Risks Companies Face When Their Political Spending 
and Core Values Conflict and How to Address Them CTR. RESPONSIVE POL. (June 19, 2018), 
http://files.politicalaccountability.net/reports/cpa-reports/collision-course-the-risks-companies-
face-when-their-political-spending-and-core-values-conflict-and-how-to-address-
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 Not just logic, but the empirical data backs this up.  A thorough study by 
Professor Coates demonstrates that political spending by corporations is negatively 
correlated with stockholder returns.87  Other studies support his finding.88  And his 
study was not focused, as I am, on investors holding the entire market as index 
investors do, but on investors who may just buy the stock of particular firms.  On 
strong balance, he finds that corporations that engage in more political influence-
seeking tend to do worse than those that do not. 
D.  Business Leaders Often Wish They Could “Just Say No” 
There is another reality that the Big 4 seems to ignore: many businesses 
favored the pre-Citizens United world because it gave them a reason to say no to 
political pressures to use corporate money for political spending.  When something 
                                                 
them/Final_Draft_Collision_Report.pdf (documenting the backlash companies have faced from 
both the left and the right due to their political contributions).     
87 Coates, supra note 84, at 358;  
88 See Bebchuk et. al, supra note 69, at 8 n.22 (collecting six studies “finding that [corporate 
political spending] is associated with negative effects on shareholder value”).     
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is illegal, you can just do a Nancy Reagan.  After Citizens United, when businesses 
are solicited by so-called “independent” organizations seeking to support particular 
candidates, they can no longer truthfully say that the law forbids the corporation 
from doing so.  To think that corporations are immune from political and industry 
pressures is to attribute to their managers a disconnection from the reality of power 
relations that lacks any credible real world basis.  Many business managers would 
like to focus on business as they once could.  Action by the Big 4 to constrain 
corporate political spending that lacks stockholder assent would restore sanity and 
end an unhealthy incentive system that has poured tons of money into stealthy 
organizations seeking to influence who governs our society. 
E.  Human Investors Have Other Values at Stake  
 And let’s not lose sight of something essential.  Human beings have values 
that are at least as important as money.  Much of what makes us human is not about 
money.  The idea that the disabled should be able to live in dignity.  The idea that 
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the elderly should be secure in their old age.  The importance of providing children 
with a quality education.  The notion that the humanities writ large, including the 
arts, are part of being human.  And those ideas, I admit, are ones I hold.  But others 
hold equally important ones that I might not share. 
 The fact that an elected official will support the energy policy Exxon-Mobil 
wants does not mean that the elected official, on the myriad issues she must vote 
upon as a member of Congress, deserves support from those whose capital Exxon-
Mobil holds.  Put in the words “technology policy” and Facebook and the issue 
would be the same.  This is not a liberal or conservative issue; it is just a fact-based 
problem.  Corporations in which the Big 4 invest are not a fitting political proxy for 
the human investors whose real money is being used.  Quite the opposite.  They do 
not face the moral mirror test that human beings must when they decide to support 
a candidate.  A candidate who is an environmentalist might appeal to me, but not if 
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she is a racist.89  If I wish to be a responsible, moral citizen, I must judge candidates 
on the full range of issues they will be entrusted to address.  Business corporations, 
being things entirely different from human beings, cannot and do not do this.  And, 
as a result, their interests diverge starkly from that of their Worker Investors.  
                                                 
89 The divergence between human-political considerations and corporate-political considerations 
is most recently illustrated by Google, Facebook, Wal-Mart, and other corporations funding a 
Senate campaign.  When pressure mounted because the candidate made statements that seemed to 
make light of public hangings and was pictured wearing confederate garb, these companies were 
forced to backtrack and asked the Senator to return their campaign contributions. See Dan Mangan, 
Facebook Asks Sen. Cindy Hyde-Smith for Contribution Refund (CNBC, Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/27/facebook-asks-sen-cindy-hyde-smith-for-contribution-
back.html.  Even before this, the tension between the political views of this candidate and the 
public profile of some of the donating companies seems stark, but is reconciled by the obvious, 
which is that the companies were seeking to curry favor with an incumbent on committees of 
jurisdiction important to their industries.  Other human values were put to the side, until the 
incumbent engaged in behavior that put the companies themselves in bad light by their association 
with her.  This episode just highlights the ability of corporations to focus on issues that matter 
without viewing a candidate holistically, as human-voters must.   
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VII.  Have No Pity for the Haves 
 
 Now, even though it has the least empirical or logical force of any argument, 
some will undoubtedly argue that stockholder constraints on corporate political 
spending will leave these entities helpless, voiceless, powerless victims of a political 
process dominated by the voice of workers, environmentalists, supporters of the arts, 
and consumer advocates.90  This argument, of course, is empty of fact-based force.  
Before our Supreme Court invented or discovered in 2010 — over 200 years after 
the Founding — the constitutional right of business entities to pour funds into 
advocating for the election or defeat of political candidates without legislative 
constraint, guess what the reality was?   
                                                 
90 Requiring corporations to disclose their political spending would in fact level the playing field 
with unions, which are required to disclose their political spending under current law.  See Bebchuk 
et al., supra note 56, at *13 (“[U]nions must report ‘direct and indirect disbursements to all entities 
and individuals during the reporting period associated with political disbursements or contributions 
in money.”) (quoting Department of Labor LM-2 Form, Schedule 16).   
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 Business interests already were the dominant force in spending on lobbying 
and politics, far outpacing the spending of labor unions, environmental 
organizations, and other interests that reflect the more flesh and blood concerns of 
human beings.  Before Citizens United, corporations were free to spend corporate 
money to organize PACs, raise funds from stockholders and managers voluntarily, 
and spend PAC funds on contributions.91  And, of course, large stockholders and 
well-paid executives were free to use their own massive wealth for that purpose.  
Thus, even before Citizens United, business interests swamped others in spending.92  
                                                 
91 See 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2) (permitting corporations, before Citizens United, to solicit 
contributions to “a separate segregated fund to be utilized for corporate purposes”).  52 U.S.C. 
§ 30118(a) banned corporations from using treasury funds on politics, but that ban was declared 
unconstitutional by Citizens United.    
92 For example, according to data from the Center for Responsive politics, in the 2004 presidential 
election cycle, that is before Citizens United but after McCain-Feingold, “business” outspend 
“labor” by a factor of 24.  The same trend was true in the 2008 presidential election.  See Business-
Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual Donations to Candidates, Parties, Super PACs and 
Outside Spending Groups, CTR. RESPONSIVE POLITICS, available at 
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/blio.php?utm_source=datafeatrue&utm_medium=internal
&utm_campaign=internal-cfblio-062518.  The same trend is true of environmental spending.  In 
2004, businesses associated with environmental spending—such as those in the Chemical Industry 
or Energy Sector—spent over $132 million on politics, over 33 times more than Environmental 
groups spent.  Id.  Although Environmental groups have seen their spending increase as worry 
over climate change has grown, in 2016, businesses still outspent Environmental groups by a factor 
of three.   
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This is of course to be expected.  After all, if labor had the funds of capital, it would 
be capital. 
 After Citizens United, this huge advantage of business over workers, business 
over environmentalists, and business over consumers has grown even more.93  And 
the known data likely understates the advantage, because so much spending flows 
through dark money vehicles.   
 Other realities undercut the idea that public corporations need the ability to 
engage in electioneering to be fairly heard by elected officials and regulators.  In 
2016, for example, the top 50 lobbying organizations, such as the National 
Association of Realtors or the American Hospital Association, shelled out $716 
                                                 
93 For example, in 2014, after Citizens United, business likely to lobby on environmental issues—
such as businesses in the Energy, Chemicals, and Forestry Sectors—outspent pro-environment 
groups by a factor of 2.5, with businesses spending about $218 million during that election cycle 
compared to $86 million from environmentalist.  Business interest also outspend labor.  In 2016, 
for instance, business spent $3.3 billion on politics compared to labor’s $213 million.  See 
Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual Donations to Candidates, Parties, Super 
PACs and Outside Spending Groups (Ctr. for Responsive Politics), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/blio.php. 
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million to influence legislation.  Of these 50 organizations, only one — the AARP 
— was not a business or business-related entity.94   
 Not only do corporations have an advantage when it comes to getting their 
preferred candidates in office, but they have an advantage in steering the regulatory 
process as well.95  Regulators are deferential to industry input,96 and corporations 
use their huge financial advantage to dominate the regulatory and ruling making 
process, and to tie up agencies in litigation if they don’t get their way.97   
                                                 
94 Megan R. Wilson, Lobbying’s Top 50:  Who’s Spending Big (The Hill, Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/318177-lobbyings-top-50-whos-
spending-big. 
95 Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC Rulemaking, 36 
SEATTLE L. REV. 695, 722 (2013) (observing that in the regulatory process “industry groups 
dominate both the public and private mechanisms for provision of information and influence.186 
They are represented disproportionately in the comment letters and private meetings, and they 
provide the overwhelming majority of comments that include data, statistics, or alternatives to the 
proposed rulemakings”).   
96 David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 304–05 (2006) (suggest that agencies 
“look to the private sector for assistance with rule generation”).  
97 John C. Coates, IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation:  Case Studies and 
Implications, 124 YALE L. J. 882, 954–55 (2015) (observing that business interests are more likely 
to challenge regulations they disfavor in court, which may influence the regulators appetite for 
initiating the regulation in the first place). 
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 As important, for generations now, businesses have used the threat of 
departure — even to other nations!98 — and downsizings, to get their way on 
legislative policy and to shift the tax base of the United States away from business 
entities and to human beings.  The share of overall taxes in the U.S. paid by 
corporations now is 300% less than it was in the 1950s.99  Businesses use their ability 
to relocate, shift jobs to other jurisdictions, and other coercive options to accomplish 
favorable tax policy, extract subsidies for initiatives to grow or sometimes even to 
stay in downsized form, and to demand favorable regulatory policies.100  That is 
                                                 
98 Leo E. Strine, Jr. Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose II:  An Encouragement for Future 
Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165, 1174–75 
(2017) (documenting the wave of corporation inversions—that is a transaction in which a U.S. 
Corporation restructures so that its parent corporation becomes a foreign corporation—purely for 
tax benefits).  In the last five years, more than twenty American companies have used an 
“inversion” to redomicile themselves outside the U.S.  See Zachard Mider, Tax Inversion 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/tax-inversion (documenting 
this trend).   
99 Jay L. Zagorksy, The Share of Tax Dollars Coming From You Is Growing – And The Share 
From Companies Is Shrinking, (Apr. 18, 2017, MarketWatch), available at 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/who-pays-a-growing-share-of-taxes-individuals-or-
companies-2017-04-13 (“As a result, overall businesses’ funding of the federal government has 
fallen dramatically since 1945. Back then, corporations provided over one-third of all federal 
revenue. In 2015, the figure was a bit over 10%, a threefold reduction.”).   
100 Sanford Levinson, Randy Barnett’s Critique of Democracy (and John Marshall?), 32 CONST. 
COMMENT. 113, 135 (2017) (“Business corporations relocate all the time, seeking the most 
favorable tax treatment for their profits.”); How States Are Improving Tax Incentives for Jobs and 
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especially so of large public corporations such as the ones represented in the major 
indexes.  Amazon’s pursuit of huge public subsidies to locate its next headquarters 
in a major metropolitan area is just a gigantic example of quotidian corporate 
behavior.101   
* * * 
 
 For all these reasons, unconstrained corporate political spending is harmful to 
Worker Investors, public companies themselves, and our economy.   
                                                 
Growth *1 (Pew Charitable Trusts, May 2017) (observing that tax incentives “are one of the 
primary tools that states use to try to create jobs, attract new business,” and stop other businesses 
from relocating elsewhere), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-
/media/assets/2017/05/edti_how_states_are_improving_tax_incentives_for_jobs_and_growth.pdf
?la=en&hash=30874D04D965B7C2AEBEA57ECE303ABBDB2D8A71; Louise Story, As 
Companies Seek Tax Deals, Governments Pay High Price (N.Y. Times Dec. 1, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/us/how-local-taxpayers-bankroll-
corporations.html?pagewanted=all&mcubz=3&module=inline (finding that “states, counties and 
cities are giving up more than $80 billion each year to companies” in tax and other incentives to 
stop companies from relocating). 
101 Ben Casselman, A $2 Billion Question:  Did New York and Virginia Overpay for Amazon?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/13/business/economy/amazon-
hq2-va-long-island-city-incentives.html; see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power is Corporate 
Purpose I:  Evidence from My Hometown 33, OXFORD REV. ECON. POLICY 176 (2017).   
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 Unless the double legitimacy problem is addressed, the entrusted capital of 
Worker Investors will continue to be deployed against them, tilting our democracy 
even more toward moneyed interests at the expense of the flesh and blood concerns 
of living, breathing Americans. 
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VIII.  Conclusion:  The Big 4 Have the Power to Improve The Integrity of 
Our Democracy And Public Corporations By Constraining Undisclosed and 
Unauthorized Political Spending  
The power of the Big 4 to change this dynamic and improve the integrity of 
our democracy is enormous.  Although the Big 4 never use their clout to 
affirmatively make proposals102 — another gap in fiduciary responsibility that 
should be considered — their behavior is a critical consideration for other 
institutional investors who do make proposals.  If the Big 4 open their eyes, 
recognize that they are not faithfully representing the interests of their Worker 
Investors, and vote to constrain political spending, they could put a system-wide 
break on excessive and illegitimate corporate political spending.   
And precisely because the Big 4 concede that they have no legitimacy to act 
as political proxies for their Worker Investors, they necessarily concede that the 
                                                 
102 Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 13, at 44 (“[O]ur review of the almost-4,000 shareholder proposals 
submitted from 2008 to 2017 did not identify a single proposal submitted by any of the Big 
Three.”).   
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managers of the companies they put Worker Investors’ capital into have no such 
legitimacy.  For that reason, the Big 4 cannot escape responsibility by disclaiming 
their lack of legitimacy and allowing unconstrained corporate spending, they must 
instead put on their fiduciary boots and do the hard work of representing their 
Worker Investors.   
After Citizens United there was a surge in proposals to curb political 
spending.103  But, in large part because the Big 4 did not support those proposals, 
they failed.  Discouraged by this lack of success, the number of political spending 
proposals has dwindled in recent years.104  A shift by the Big 4 would reverse this 
trend and rapidly result in a major tilt in the policy of public corporations .    
                                                 
103 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?:  The Tension 
Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 
378 n.185 (2015) (documenting this “significant uptick” in stockholder proposals in the immediate 
aftermath of Citizens United).   
104 See Reilly S. Steel, Corporate Political Spending and the Size Effect, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 
ONLINE 1, 4 (2017) (documenting the number of political spending proposals from 2012 to 2016 
and showing an initial uptick in 2012–2014 followed by a decline).   
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At the very least, the Big 4 cannot credibly continue to vote against proposals 
to make public corporations disclose their political expenditures, when there is 
overwhelming evidence that no one, including the FEC, can credibly track the 
corporate money flowing into our political process.105  Their refusal to require 
corporations to disclose the very information that would make monitoring 
theoretically possible is perverse and unprincipled.  And the Big 4 is poorly 
positioned to argue that they would monitor corporate political spending effectively 
if they only had the fuller disclosure they need to do so, given that they too lack the 
staff capacity to do so.  Therefore, if the Big 4 is being honest, they must admit that 
                                                 
105 Dark Money Basics, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, available at 
https://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/basics (“While some outside groups — like super PACs 
— are required to disclose their donors, others are not, such as 501(c)(4)s.  Both types of 
organizations can engage in a number of activities, including buying ads that advocate for or 
against a candidate, running phone banks and making contributions to super PACs.”); Ciara 
Torres-Spelliscy, The 2018 Elections Have $100 Million in Dark Money and Counting BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 22, 2018), available at https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/2018-
elections-dark-money (“It’s been eight years since Citizens United v. FEC, and America still 
doesn’t have transparency about the sources of money in politics.  To wit, over $100 million in 
dark money has been spent as of October 17, 2018, with key weeks left in the midterms.”).   
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political spending wouldn’t be a high priority given the difficulty they already have 
in fulfilling their stewardship role in matters of business policy.   
For that reason, the clearest way for the Big 4 to correct their fiduciary blind 
spot would be for them to support proposals to bar corporate political spending 
without super-majority stockholder support.  And if the Big 4 think that is radical, 
then they are calling a radical a legend of their own industry: Vanguard founder and 
index fund icon Jack Bogle.106  In the wake of Citizens United, Jack Bogle argued 
that corporations should be required to gain approval from 75% of their shareholders 
before they spend on politics.107  “Such a ‘supermajority’ requirement is necessary,” 
                                                 
106 And, of course, Jack Bogle is no radical.  He is just a caring, self-aware American who cares 
about our nation and who understands how important it is that the industry and company whose 
success he helped generate exercise its fiduciary duties.  And he is not alone.  At a time when there 
is undisputed data that our economy has been working less effectively for Worker Investors and 
inequality is growing, the economically powerful must be held accountable for using that power 
responsibly.   
107 John C. Bogle, The Supreme Court Had Its Say.  Now Let Shareholders Decide, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 14, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/opinion/15bogle.html. (“And yet I believe 
that, in the wake of the Supreme Court case, known as Citizens United, the institutional investor 
community has an obligation to act.  Institutional investors should insist that the proxy statement 
of each company in which they invest contain the following: ‘Resolved: That the corporation shall 
make no political contributions without the approval of the holders of at least 75 percent of its 
shares outstanding.’”).  Taking a cue from Mr. Bogle, Senator Elizabeth Warren recently proposed 
a bill, the Accountable Capitalism Act, to require “[a]t least 75% of directors and shareholders to 
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Mr. Bogle argued, “because of the inevitably wide range of views that characterize 
any shareholder base.”108  Mr. Bogle’s words are even more resonant now, with 
widening inequality and widespread concern that the benefits of our economy’s 
growth are being increasingly taken by the wealthy few, to the exclusion of the many 
responsible for that increased output. 
For most Americans, their key fiduciary is not a public company board, it is 
one or more of the Big 4.109  It is not asking too much of the Big 4 to make sure that 
Worker Investors’ trapped capital is not used to tilt the playing field even more 
against ordinary, human Americans, to subject them to the huge costs that come 
when corporations influence regulatory policies to take shortcuts that hurt workers, 
consumers and the environment, and to shift the focus of corporate management 
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away from legitimate, productive ways to generate sustainable wealth and toward 
rent-seeking.  By abdicating their duty to police political spending, the Big 4 has, in 
effect, enabled corporations to use Worker Investors’ capital for these purposes.   
With the Big 4’s power comes a corresponding fiduciary duty.  It must be used 
to end the double legitimacy problem of corporate political spending and to take a 
measured, but important, step to restore some basic equality to our nation’s politics.   
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